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A B S T R A C T
Many human societies feature institutions for redistributing resources from some individuals to others, but
preferred levels of redistribution vary greatly within and between populations. We postulate that support for
redistribution is the output of a structured cognitive system that is sensitive to features of the social situation. We
developed an experimental approach in which participants prescribe appropriate redistribution for hypothetical
villages whose features vary. Over seven experiments involving 2400 adults from the UK, we show that parti-
cipants shift their redistribution preferences systematically as situational features change. Higher levels of re-
distribution are favoured when luck is more important in the initial distribution of resources; when social groups
are more homogeneous; when the group is at war; and when resources are abundant rather than scarce.
Judgements about the right level of redistribution carry moderate or high levels of moral conviction. Participants
have systematic intuitions about when the implementation of redistribution will prove problematic, distinct
from their intuitions about when it is desirable. Individuals are only weakly consistent in the level of redis-
tribution they prefer, and political orientation explains rather little variation in preferred redistribution for a
given situation. We argue that people have divergent views on redistribution at least in part because they have
different appraisals of the features of their societies. Understanding the operating principles of the psychology of
redistribution may help explain variation and change in support for, and hence existence of, redistributive
institutions across societies and over time.
1. Introduction
Developed economies typically have institutionalised arrangements
for transferring resources from certain individuals, generally those who
are better off, to others, usually those who are vulnerable or in need.
These arrangements are not unique to developed economies: many
subsistence-level societies featured systematic sharing or mutual aid
practices (Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013). A stated desire for redistributive
mechanisms is widespread amongst citizens, and governments pre-
sumably introduce or maintain such mechanisms in order to satisfy this
desire. However, redistributive sentiment is always variable and con-
tentious; support for redistribution varies substantially both within and
between societies (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009; Alesina, Glaeser, &
Sacerdote, 2001; Dallinger, 2010; Lübker, 2007; Rueda, 2018). The
level of support is not simply explained by the level of economic in-
equality in a society; it appears to matter how that inequality, and the
whole context of the society, is perceived and understood (Dallinger,
2010; Lübker, 2007). Support for redistribution can change markedly
within a society over time, and when this happens, the change is related
to changes in perceptions and beliefs about how society works, rather
than changes in the actual inequality of market outcomes (Georgiadis &
Manning, 2012). Explaining the variability of support for redistribution
is an important building block of understanding the origins of political
disagreements, and of the different social policy courses that different
countries follow over time.
Although variability in support for redistribution is glaringly ob-
vious, its causal origins remain incompletely understood. There are
several layers to a person's view on redistribution: it can be associated
with the extent to which they personally stand to lose or gain (Alesina &
Giuliano, 2009; Rueda, 2018); their experience of the particular in-
stitutions of their country; or their sense of affiliation to particular
political parties that espouse positions on the issue (Cohen, 2003). Even
stripping these layers away, though, variation in views on redistribu-
tion remains. Researchers have attributed components of this variation
to a variety of individually-stable latent variables such as cultural
norms (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009; Dallinger, 2010), dispositional
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compassion (Sznycer et al., 2017), social dominance orientation (Kteily,
Sheehy-Skeffington, & Ho, 2017), or moral foundations (Graham,
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016). However, po-
sitions on policy issues are not, in general, completely stable within
individuals: they are least partly recomputed ‘online’ as information is
encountered (Berinsky, 2017; Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989;
Tourangeau & Ransinski, 1988). Likewise, preferences for redistribu-
tion are not simply context-insensitive readouts of stable inner vari-
ables: they depend on details of the specific case, such as the apparent
effort or deservingness of the recipient (Aaroe & Petersen, 2014; Almås,
Cappelen, & Tungodden, 2019; Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, & Tooby,
2012).
We start from the basic principle that, for humans over the course of
their history, there have been sets of circumstances where it was
adaptively advantageous to share (i.e. redistribute) resources with
others, and other sets circumstances where it was advantageous to
share less, or not at all (Aktipis et al., 2018; Hamilton, 1975; Nettle,
Panchanathan, Rai, & Fiske, 2011; Roberts, 2005). Given the recurrence
and importance of redistribution-related decisions, we hypothesize that
humans possess a proximal psychology of redistribution. We conceive of
this as a structured cognitive system that takes sets of situational fea-
tures, encompassing key aspects of the ecological challenges in force as
well as the nature of the relationships amongst the individuals included,
combines them, and outputs judgements about appropriate redistribu-
tion for that social grouping. These judgements concern the right level
of redistribution, and potentially other things too, such as how the re-
distribution process should be organized, and the problems that might
befall it. We further hypothesize that the judgements outputted by the
psychology of redistribution carry moral force. We do not directly test
this until study 7, but there is some suggestive evidence that it may be
correct. Almås et al. (2019) found that people's decisions about how
much to redistribute were largely insensitive to the efficiency of the
redistributive mechanism. This implies that, where people decide re-
distribution is called for, it is experienced as a moral obligation rather
than merely pragmatic. If our assumption concerning moral force is
correct, the psychology of redistribution is a part of moral psychology,
and may share many features with other moral computations. For ex-
ample, we expect that providing even impoverished or minimal cues of
relevant situational features should be sufficient to evoke or suppress
preferences for redistribution (as is true in general in moral cognition,
Mikhail, 2007). These preferences may be largely intuitive, and indeed,
people may not be able to provide explicit reasons for them.
To which situational features is the psychology of redistribution
most likely to be sensitive? Correlational research suggests three can-
didates: the perceived role of luck in generating the initial inequality in
resources, the homogeneity of group members, and the presence of
active intergroup conflict. Individuals who believe that the initial dis-
tribution of resources is more a result of luck than of effort are more
likely to support redistribution (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009). A recurrent
problem that humans have faced in all kinds of societies is risk – the
chance deviation of the return on an action from its expected return.
People reduce their exposure to risk by risk-pooling, the sharing of
returns across a number of independent actors (Dyble et al., 2016;
Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013). Thus, we should expect cues that members of
society can try hard but have bad luck to increase support for redis-
tribution. Individuals also support redistribution more when the social
group over which redistribution will occur is more socially homo-
geneous, for example in terms of ethnicity (Alesina et al., 2001; Rueda,
2018). There are a number of possible explanations for this: homo-
geneity may serve as a cue of kinship, triggering motivations for kin-
directed altruism (Krupp, Debruine, & Barclay, 2008); social homo-
geneity may imply similarity of values or interests, which may make
redistributive rules easier to coordinate on (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly,
1999); or social homogeneity may imply embeddedness in the same
social networks, which makes selfish exploitation of the redistributive
system easier to detect and sanction (Habyarimana, Humphreys,
Posner, & Weinstein, 2007). Whichever of these is correct, we expect
homogeneity to be another feature to which the psychology of redis-
tribution is sensitive. There is also a long tradition of historical and
political research arguing that war promotes the development of re-
distributive policies (see e.g. Kasza, 2006). Even in artificial interac-
tions in a lab, between-group competition increases within-group co-
operation (Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie, & West, 2010). Since the
effectiveness of a group in between-group competition depends on the
aggregate state of all the group members, between-group competition
provides a positive stake of all individuals in the welfare of their fellow
group members. We therefore expect the psychology of redistribution to
be sensitive to between-group competition, and support for redis-
tribution to increase where this feature is cued.
Over a series of seven studies, we developed an experimental
method for investigating the psychology of redistribution. This builds
on the limited prior experimental research on the topic (Aaroe &
Petersen, 2014; Almås et al., 2019) in a number of ways. Those studies
were restricted to the role of luck in generating the initial distribution
of resources, whereas we consider a broader range of situational fea-
tures. The prior research either asked about support for welfare in
participants' actual societies, and used vignettes to foreground the
possibility of bad luck (Aaroe & Petersen, 2014); or else had partici-
pants decide whether to redistribute between the members of artificial
work groups where payoffs were either determined by chance, or by
performance (Almås et al., 2019). In place of either of these methods,
we asked individuals to make judgements about hypothetical faraway
societies in which they will never live (see Sprong & Jetten, 2019 for
other uses of this approach). We then parametrically varied the situa-
tional features of the societies. Our descriptions of the hypothetical
societies are deliberately minimal. Minimal, schematic stimuli of this
kind are often used in research on moral psychology, where they are
useful for laying bare basic cognitive operating principles through
carefully chosen feature alterations (Conway, Goldstein-Greenwood,
Polacek, & Greene, 2018; Mikhail, 2007). In our case, using hypothe-
tical villages usefully strips away participants' habitual positions on,
and personal interactions with, the political and welfare systems of
their country. All but one of our experiments used within-subjects de-
signs. The same participants were asked about their ideal level of re-
distribution repeatedly for a series of societies that differed on sets of
situational features. This allows strong inference about causality, since
any systematic differences in preferred redistribution can only reflect
changes in the specified situational features, not the person. We also
measured self-reported political orientation, so were able to test to what
extent this correlates with the solutions participants suggest for the
hypothetical societies, or moderates their response to particular situa-
tional features.
Surveys of support for redistribution typically use a single-item
dependent measure, so that the only dimension measured is preference
for ‘less’ versus ‘more’ redistribution (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009;
Dallinger, 2010; Rueda, 2018). This is also our main dependent mea-
sure. However, people may also have intuitions about how the redis-
tribution should be organized, what the benefits might be, and what
obstacles may arise in implementation. On the question of how redis-
tribution should be organized, there are two main alternatives: tar-
geting need, which is the predominant organizing principle of existing
welfare systems, or an unconditional and equal ration for all members
of society. This is the Universal Basic Income principle, long discussed
as philosophically attractive, but implemented only in restricted cases,
such as old-age entitlements and Alaska's permanent fund dividend
(Standing, 2017). In studies 1–4, we sought to determine whether the
same features that affect preferences about the level of redistribution
also affect which of these two approaches is deemed preferable. As for
implementation, people may have intuitive theories about the kinds of
problematic consequences (for example, evasion, cheating and dis-
agreement) that will stem from imposing redistribution over social
groups of different kinds. In studies 5 and 6, we therefore also
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investigated how situational features affected judgements about the
benefits and problems that would stem from implementing a redis-
tributive system.
2. Studies 1–6
Studies 1–6 represent the main body of our experimental series. As
they were all close variants of one another, we now present their
methods and results concurrently rather than sequentially. Study 7 was
a follow-up between-subjects study and is described after discussion of
studies 1–6. All study protocols and predictions were pre-registered on
Open Science Framework (see Supporting Information (SI), Section 1
for details). For each new study, we pre-registered predictions in the
light of the results of the earlier studies. Thus, the findings reported
below consist of a mixture of confirmatory tests of predictions that we
made at the outset of the project; purely exploratory analyses; and
findings that were exploratory the first time they were observed, and
then incorporated as pre-registered predictions for later studies. We
have briefly indicated which type of finding each one is below, and we
encourage interested readers to consult the individual study protocols
for full lists of predictions and plans for exploratory analysis.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. General framework
Studies 1–6 were completed with adult UK-national volunteers re-
cruited from an online research participant pool (mean ages per study
32.63–35.64 years, s.d.s 10.04–12.92 years, ranges 18–19 to 60–73).
Each participant completed just one experiment and did so remotely, in
return for a small financial incentive. All participants gave written in-
formed consent and the studies were approved by the Faculty of
Medical Sciences ethics committee at Newcastle University.
There were 100 participants in each experiment (48–51 males,
49–52 females, 0–1 other). On average participants rated themselves
somewhat to the left of centre politically, but with a good range of
variation (on a 0–100 scale with left-wing as 0, means per experiment
34.69–40.22, s.d.s 19.06–23.99, ranges 0 to 85–100). We also com-
pleted two pilot experiments, again featuring 100 participants each.
The results of the pilots were consistent with those of studies 1 and 2,
but the dependent measures suffered comprehension and interpretative
problems, and those pilots are not reported here.
Participants were told that they would receive information about a
series of villages ‘in a faraway country that you are never likely to visit’,
except for Study 3 where the instruction was ‘imagine you lived in each
village’. They were told that in all villages, villagers live by growing
food in their gardens, every villager has a garden, all gardens are equal
in size, and the size of the harvest is affected by the amount of effort put
in, but also by luck, because there can be floods, insects and plant
diseases that strike at random. There then followed a series of villages
(6 villages in studies 1 and 2; 8 villages in studies 3 and 4; 4 villages in
studies 5 and 6) where key information about the village was varied
independently on several dimensions (see Section 2.1.2). Participants
set their preferred level of redistribution for each village (see Section
2.1.3). The information on each village was presented in the form of
summary graphics in studies 1–4 and verbal descriptions in studies 5
and 6 (see SI Section 1 for links to materials). In studies 1–4, compre-
hension questions were used to establish that participants had under-
stood what the summary graphics represented. Pass rates on compre-
hension questions were 93–98% in all cases. Villages were presented in
random order and all possible combinations of different village features
were presented (that is, all designs were fully factorial). On conclusion
of the final village, participants were asked about their own political
orientations (see Section 2.1.4).
2.1.2. Independent variables
The key independent variables tested are summarised in Table 1. As
the experimental series progressed, independent variables were added
or dropped, or other alterations made, in response to findings of the
previous study. The rationale for each change is explained in Section
2.2.
In studies 1–4, we used a graphical method of manipulating ap-
praisals of the society. This was motivated by a desire to strip complex
representations down to the simplest possible perceptual cues, avoiding
potentially leading phraseology. For studies 5–6, we used simple verbal
statements instead, and results appear to be similar. In studies 1–4, we
manipulated the importance of luck by showing a bar graph divided
into a ‘luck’ part and an ‘effort’ part, with the relative sizes varied
(Fig. 1A, C). Social heterogeneity was manipulated by stating that in
each village, unrelated to gardening activity, individuals have beliefs,
customs and ways of dressing. A tableau of coloured-in human silhou-
ettes was then shown where ‘the more similar the colours, the more the
similar the people of that village are to one another in terms of beliefs,
customs and appearance’ (Fig. 1B, D). All tableaux had the same mean
RGB values, but the variation in R, G and B values between figures
within a tableau was either high (producing figures of very different
colours to one another) or low (producing near-uniform colours). In
study 5, it was simply stated verbally that villagers are ‘very similar to
one another’ or ‘rather different from one another’ ‘in terms of beliefs,
customs and appearance’.
In study 4, the presence of war was indicated by a graphic with a red
flash or yellow sun. The initial participant instructions specified that if
there was a red flash the village ‘is often at war with neighbouring
villages for land and resources’, whereas if a yellow sun was shown
‘there is no conflict over land and resources, and peace reigns’. In study
5, war was manipulated with the verbal statements ‘the village is a
peace with all of its neighbouring villages’ or ‘the village is at war with
a neighbouring village’ (see Section 2.2 for further explanation).
2.1.3. Dependent variables
The main dependent variable, common to all studies, was the level
of redistribution that the participant judged to be right for that village.
Instructions explained that the villagers have a common store, and that
each villager is obliged to place a certain proportion of their harvest
into it. This proportion is the same for all villagers. The common store is
then shared out. Participants were asked what would be ‘the ideal
proportion’ (studies 1–4) or ‘the right proportion’ (studies 5 and 6) to be
obligatorily put into the common store. Participants indicated their
response by moving a slider along a scale 0% to 100% (initial slider
position 50%). For studies 1–4, an additional dependent measure set
out two ideas for how the common store could be distributed: an equal
share for each villager, or giving the common store specifically to those
with the smallest harvest. We refer to this as the mode of redistribution.
Participants indicated their view on which idea was better using a slider
from 0 (‘equal shares better’) to 100 (‘targeting smaller harvests better’)
with initial slider position 50 (‘equally good’).
Studies 5 and 6 introduced additional questions to understand
people's reasons for their observed shifts in preferred level of redis-
tribution. In study 5, participants rated, on a scale 0–100, how much of
a problem eight potential issues would be for that particular village if
the village set a redistribution rate of 90%. The issues were: decline in
gardening effort by those with large harvests; decline in gardening ef-
fort by those with small harvests; non-payment in by those with large
harvests; over-claiming from the common store; difficulty punishing
and detecting cheating; arguments over redistribution causing conflict
and division; undermining the motivation of those with large harvests
to defend the village; and undermining the motivation of those with
small harvests to defend the village. In study 6, participants rated the
likelihood of six bad outcomes (decline in village's ability to defend
itself against other villages; death of individual villagers; decline in
gardening effort; non-payment in; over-claiming; and increased social
conflict and division) on a 0–100 scale, first if the village set the re-
distribution rate very high, and then again if the village set the
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redistribution rate very low.
2.1.4. Individual differences variables
In all six studies, we measured participants' self-placement on a
single left-right political spectrum (slider 0–100). This is widely used as
a cross-culturally applicable single-item summary of political orienta-
tion, for example in the World Values Survey (Alesina & Giuliano,
2009). The single left-right dimension has been argued to capture a
substantial proportion of the variation in stated preferences for sub-
stantive policy options, in a way that is consistent across populations
and time, and self-placement on it is strongly associated with redis-
tribution preferences in real societies (Rockey, 2009). We added the
reference instructions ‘in the UK, the Labour party is described as more
to the left, and the Conservative party as more to the right’ to provide
greater specificity for our UK samples. We also measured the short form
of the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Ho et al., 2015). This is a
measure of support for the existence of inequality between social
groups that correlates with opposition to redistributive policies (Kteily
et al., 2017). Scale reliability for SDO was high in all six studies (α
values 0.82–0.86). Left-right self-placement and SDO were positively
highly correlated in all studies, with more right-wing people having
higher SDO scores (rs 0.46–0.71, all ps < 0.01). We also measured self-
placement on the continuum ‘people should take care of themselves’ (0)
to ‘the government should do everything to improve the standard of
living for poor people’ (100); and whether, in the long run, hard work
brings a better life (0) or it's more a matter of luck and connections
(100). The former variable, or variants of it, is widely used as a measure
of support for redistribution in the participant's actual society (Alesina
& Giuliano, 2009; Kenworthy & Mccall, 2008). The latter variable is a
measure of the perceived importance of luck in actual society (Alesina
& Giuliano, 2009).
2.1.5. Data analysis
Data were analysed using linear mixed models to account for re-
peated measures from the same participants. Significance testing for
mixed models used Satterthwaite's method (for full model tables, see SI,
Section 2). The models reported below, unless otherwise stated, con-
tained only the additive effects of the independent variables. In all
cases, we experimented with models also including interaction terms; in
no case were these significant or model fit improved. Hence, the main
effects of each independent variable can be presented separately
Section 2.2, collapsing over the levels of the others. The extent of in-
dividual consistency in preferred level of redistribution was evaluated
by the intra-class correlation coefficient. Final data files for all studies
and R scripts for analyses are available via the Open Science Framework
[dataset] (Nettle & Saxe, 2019).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Luck
In study 1, luck had three levels (low: harvest size 10% luck;
medium: 45% luck; and high: 80% luck). A greater role of luck in-
creased preferred redistribution (confirming pre-registered prediction;
Fig. 2A; Bmedium = 4.61 (s.e. 2.21), Bhigh = 16.55 (2.21); F2,
497 = 29.85, p < .001). We noted that even with low luck in study 1, a
considerable level of redistribution was endorsed (estimated marginal
mean 44.5 (s.e. 2.03)). For study 2, we therefore changed the levels of
luck to zero role of luck, medium (45%) and high (80%). Again in-
creasing role of luck strongly increased preferred redistribution (con-
firming pre-registered prediction; Fig. 2B; Bmedium = 7.96 (2.02),
Bhigh = 16.21 (2.02); F2, 497 = 32.33, p < .001). However, con-
siderable redistribution was preferred even at the zero luck level (es-
timated marginal mean 41.1 (2.14)). Studies 3 and 4 used two levels of
luck, low (10%) and high (80%), and both replicated the results of
study 1 (confirming pre-registered predictions; study 3: Bhigh = 13.90
(1.44), F1, 697 = 93.10, p < .001; study 4: Bhigh = 7.10 (1.60), F1,
697 = 19.64, p < .001).
As well as influencing preferred level of redistribution, luck
Table 1
Summary of the variables manipulated in studies 1–6.
Study Main independent variables Additional independent variables
Luck Heterogeneity War
1 3 levels (low, medium, high) 2 levels (homogeneous, heterogeneous) Not tested None
2 3 levels (none, medium, high) 2 levels (homogeneous, heterogeneous) Not tested None
3 2 levels (low, high) 2 levels (homogeneous, heterogeneous) Not tested Viewpoint (rich, poor)
4 2 levels (low, high) 2 levels (homogeneous, heterogeneous) 2 levels (war, peace) None
5 Not tested 2 levels (homogeneous, heterogeneous) 2 levels (war, peace) None
6 Not tested Not tested 2 levels (war, peace) Scarcity (abundance, scarcity)
Fig. 1. Example stimuli, studies 1–4. Panels A and B represent a village where
luck has a low importance and villagers are socially homogeneous; panels C and
D a village with medium importance of luck and socially heterogeneous villa-
gers.
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influenced the preferred mode of redistribution (study 1:
Bmedium = 4.89 (2.48), Bhigh = 7.36 (2.48); F2, 497 = 4.55, p = .011;
study 2: Bmedium = 14.55 (2.43), Bhigh = 17.56 (2.43); F2, 497 = 29.99,
p < .001; study 3: Bhigh = 10.84 (1.76); F1, 697 = 38.12, p < .001;
study 4: Bhigh = 11.16 (1.77); F1, 697 = 39.59, p < .001; this effect was
observed in exploratory analysis of study 1, and became a pre-regis-
tered prediction for studies 2–4). The larger the role of luck, the more
participants felt that the common store should be targeted at those with
small harvests, such that at high luck, needs-based allocation was
weakly favoured on average. Where the role of luck was small or zero,
on average participants preferred the allocation of equal shares to every
villager, in the manner of a universal basic income (Fig. 2E–H).
2.2.2. Heterogeneity
The impact of social heterogeneity was tested in studies 1–5.
Participants preferred lower levels of redistribution for heterogeneous
than homogeneous villages (confirming pre-registered prediction;
Fig. 3A–E; study 1: Bhet =−3.67 (1.81); study 2: Bhet =−2.20 (1.64);
study 3: Bhet = −3.95 (1.44); study 4: Bhet = −7.14 (1.60); study 5:
Bhet =−6.37 (1.64)). The effect was smaller than that of luck, and was
statistically significant in all but study 2 (study 1: F1, 497 = 4.13,
p = .043; study 2: F1, 497 = 1.79, p = .181; study 3: F1, 697 = 7.52,
p= .006; study 4: F1, 697 = 7.89, p= .005; study 5: F1, 297.19 = 15.16,
p < .001). In study 3, we tested a pre-registered prediction derived
from Rueda (2018) that it would be the rich in particular whose support
for redistribution would be sensitive to the homogeneity of other
members of society, by asking participants to adopt the viewpoint of
someone with a large harvest, or someone with a small harvest. Con-
trary to prediction, there was no interaction between viewpoint and
heterogeneity (F1, 696 = 1.04, p = .307), nor main effect of viewpoint
(F1, 696 = 0.16, p = .691). Heterogeneity had no effect on preferred
mode of redistribution in any of studies 1–4 (contrary to a pre-regis-
tered prediction we made for study 1; study 1: F1, 497 = 0.14, p= .708;
study 2: F1, 497 = 0.37, p = .543; study 3: F1, 697 = 0.89, p = .347;
study 4: F1, 697 = 0.01, p = .906).
In study 5 we also asked participants to rate, for each village, how
serious they thought each of eight social problems would be if the re-
distribution rate were set very high (90%). We pre-registered no pre-
dictions concerning these, and consider the following findings ex-
ploratory. All problems were rated as significantly more serious in
heterogeneous than homogeneous villages (Fig. 3F; for statistics see
figure caption). The largest differences between homogeneous and
heterogeneous villages were for avoidance of paying in by those with
large harvests (P3), over-claiming from the common store (P4), and
arguments over redistribution causing conflict and division within the
village (P6).
2.2.3. War
The impact of war was first tested in study 4. Against our pre-re-
gistered prediction, the war treatment significantly reduced the pre-
ferred level of redistribution (Fig. 4A; Bwar = −7.14 (1.60),
F1,697 = 19.87, p < .001). On reflection, we realised our method of
Fig. 2. Effects of the role in luck on redistribution preferences, studies 1–4. Shown are marginal means plus or minus one standard error. A–D: preferred level of
redistribution (percentage of harvest to be transferred to common store) by role of luck. E–H: Preferred mode of redistribution. A value of< 50 indicates the
participant thought equal shares to all villagers was better than targeting to need, and a value>50 the opposite. Scale range was 0–100.
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introducing the information that villages were at war (‘the village is
often at war with neighbouring villages for land and resources’ versus
‘there is no conflict over land and resources, and peace reigns’) might
have inadvertently provided information about scarcity of resources as
well as about war per se. In study 5, we therefore used a simple verbal
manipulation that described each village as either ‘at war with a
neighbouring village’ or ‘at peace with all of its neighbouring villages’,
with no other information. In this study, people preferred significantly
higher redistribution in the war treatment, in line with our pre-regis-
tered prediction (Fig. 4B; Bwar = 8.20 (1.64), F1,297.19 = 25.13,
p < .001). This suggests that any positive impact of war in study 4
might have been masked by a negative impact of resource scarcity. To
test this directly, study 6 used a cross-factored design manipulating
both war and scarcity. In study 6, as per our pre-registered prediction,
there was a positive effect of war on preferred redistribution (Fig. 4C;
Bwar = 5.82 (2.50), F1,298 = 5.39, p = .021), and a negative effect of
scarcity (Fig. 4D; Bscarcity = −5.94 (2.50), F1,298 = 5.62, p = .018).
War had no effect on the preferred mode of redistribution in study 4
(exploratory finding; F1,697 = 1.27, p = .260). Although participants
preferred higher redistribution in time of war, they also felt that re-
distribution would be more problematic to achieve under these
circumstances. All of the problems of high redistribution in study 5
were rated as more serious under conditions of war than peace, seven of
them significantly so (Fig. 4D; for statistics see figure caption; these
analyses were exploratory). In study 6, we also asked whether six dif-
ferent social problems would be worse under high or low redistribution
in all possible combinations of war and scarcity. We carried out ex-
ploratory analyses on these data (for full analysis, see SI, Section 3).
Again, war was anticipated to make 5/6 of the social problems sig-
nificantly worse, as was scarcity. The effects of war and scarcity were
additive and held under both high- and low-redistribution regimes. As
for high redistribution, it was anticipated to improve collective defence
and ameliorate individual starvation, but lead to declines in productive
effort, reluctance to pay in, and over-claiming. High redistribution had
no overall effect on the anticipated level of conflict and division in the
village.
2.2.4. Individual consistency and political orientation
Individual consistency across villages in preference for redistribu-
tion was 0.25–0.57 (mean across studies 0.36). Thus, individuals were
only weakly or moderately consistent in their preferences for a level of
redistribution. We calculated the within-participant range of preferred
Fig. 3. Effects of social homogeneity on preferences for redistribution, studies 1–5. Panels A–E: Preferred levels of redistribution (percentage of harvest to be
transferred to common store) for homogeneous and heterogeneous villages, studies 1–5. Shown are estimated marginal means± 1 s.e. Panel F: From study 5,
participant ratings of how serious a set of social problems would be (0–100 scale) if the redistribution rate were set very high in homogeneous and heterogeneous
villages. Shown are estimated marginal means±1 s.e. The problems are: P1: reduction in effort by those with large harvests (Bhet = 12.53 (1.84), t = 6.83,
p < .001); P2: reduction in effort by those with small harvests (Bhet = 8.66 (1.92), t = 4.52, p < .001); P3: avoidance of payment in by those with large harvests
(Bhet = 17.28 (1.99), t= 8.69, p < .001); P4: over-claiming from the common store (Bhet = 15.27 (1.92), t= 7.97, p < .001); P5: difficulty of effective detection
and punishment of cheating (Bhet = 8.81 (1.84), t= 4.79, p < .001); P6: arguments causing conflict and division within the village (Bhet = 22.04 (2.20), t= 10.03,
p < .001); P7: reduced motivation or ability of those with large harvests to fight for the village (Bhet = 7.33 (1.96), t= 3.74, p < .001); P8: reduced motivation or
ability of those with small harvests to fight for the village (Bhet = 7.78 (1.92), t = 4.05, p < .001).
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redistribution for each participant (i.e. the difference between the
highest level of redistribution they chose, and the lowest). On average,
this was 45.96 points (s.d. 26.69). Only 6% of participants chose the
same level of redistribution for every trial, and 79% shifted by 20 points
or more over the course of the experiment.
Left-right political self-placement and SDO significantly predicted
preferred redistribution for the hypothetical villages, with those clas-
sifying themselves as more right wing or scoring higher on SDO pre-
ferring lower levels of redistribution (confirming pre-registered pre-
dictions; meta-analysis across studies: left-right, B = −0.14 (0.03),
z = −4.13, p < .001; SDO, B = −0.27, (0.06), z = −4.92,
p < .001). However, these relationships were weak: pooling all 600
participants, they amounted to a correlation between mean preferred
redistribution and left-right self-placement of r =−0.17; and between
redistribution and SDO of r = −0.13. There were no significant in-
teractions, in any study, between the independent variables and poli-
tical self-placement or SDO (contrary to the pre-registered predictions
of the early studies, which included the prediction that individuals with
high SDO would be more sensitive to social heterogeneity).
We also analysed whether left-right self-placement and SDO pre-
dicted ratings of the likelihood of bad outcomes for the villages in study
6. Results for the bad outcomes were in stark contrast to those for the
preferred level of redistribution. Neither political self-placement nor
SDO significantly predicted preferred level of redistribution in the study
6 data. By contrast, left-right self-placement significantly predicted
rated likelihood of 5/6 bad outcomes, and SDO 4/6, either as a main
effect or in interaction with level of redistribution. On average, those
who were right-wing/high in SDO thought high redistribution would
Fig. 4. Effects of war on preferences for redistribution, studies 4 and 5. Panels A, B: Preferred levels of redistribution (percentage of harvest to be transferred to
common store; shown are estimated marginal means± 1 s.e.) for villages at war and at peace, studies 4 and 5. The manipulation of war in study 4 may have
inadvertently cued scarcity too (see text). Panel C: Preferred levels of redistribution (estimated marginal means± 1 s.e.) for the combinations of scarcity and war,
study 6. Panel D: From study 5, participant ratings of how serious a set of social problems would be (0–100 scale) if the redistribution rate were set very high, in
villages at war or at peace (estimated marginal means±1 s.e.). The problems are: P1: reduction in effort by those with large harvests (Bwar = 5.29 (1.84), t= 2.88,
p = .004); P2: reduction in effort by those with small harvests (Bwar = 2.90 (1.92), t = 1.52, p = .130); P3: avoidance of payment in by those with large harvests
(Bwar = 8.36 (1.99), t = 4.20, p < .001); P4: over-claiming from the common store (Bwar = 9.33 (1.92), t = 4.87, p < .001); P5: difficulty of effective detection
and punishment of cheating (Bwar = 4.06 (1.84), t = 2.21, p = .028); P6: arguments causing conflict and division within the village (Bwar = 9.53 (2.20), t = 4.34,
p < .001); P7: reduced motivation or ability of those with large harvests to fight for the village (Bwar = 11.47 (1.96), t= 5.86, p < .001); P8: reduced motivation or
ability of those with small harvests to fight for the village (Bwar = 8.92 (1.92), t = 4.64, p < .001).
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impair the village's ability to defend itself; that high redistribution
would not prevent villagers dying; that a decline in gardening effort
was more likely, regardless of the level of redistribution; that high re-
distribution would make those with large harvests more reluctant to
pay in (not significant for SDO); and that high redistribution would lead
to more conflict and division in the village (these are exploratory
findings; see SI Section 4 for full results).
2.2.5. Beliefs about actual society
Mean preferred redistribution across the hypothetical villages was
positively but weakly correlated with support for welfare in actual so-
ciety (exploratory analysis; all 600 participants: r = 0.20, p < .001).
Left-right self-placement and SDO predicted preferences for redis-
tribution actual society (confirming pre-registered prediction; left-right:
B = −0.50 (0.04), t = −13.15, p < .001; SDO: B = −1.37 (0.09),
t = −15.10, p < .001). These relationships were partially mediated
by a lesser belief in the importance of luck in actual society amongst
those who placed themselves as more right wing (exploratory analyses;
mediation pathway: B = −0.03 (0.01), z = −2.64, p = .008; med-
iation pathway accounted for 6.6% of total association), or scored
higher on SDO (B = −0.08 (0.03), z = −2.87, p = .004; mediation
pathway accounted for 5.6% of total association).
2.3. Discussion
The results of studies 1–6 were consistent across experiments.
Individual participants prescribed different levels of redistribution for
different villages, depending on situational features of the village,
namely the role of luck, the heterogeneity of the villagers, the threat of
war and the scarcity of resources. The observation of systematic within-
participant shifts in response to changed situational features is con-
sistent with our conceptualisation of the psychology of redistribution.
However, two important questions were not directly tested by studies
1–6. First, we were not able to directly estimate how important the
shifts in response to the experimental situational features were, as
compared for example to the influence of background variability in
political orientation. Second, we did not directly test our assumption
that the outputs of the psychology of redistribution carry moral force.
3. Study 7
Studies 1–6 were not well designed to reveal how large (and po-
tentially socially relevant) the effects were, compared for example to
differences related to political orientation. The effects of experimental
condition were robust, and effects of individual differences in political
orientation were small. However, given the within-subjects design, each
participant saw villages from all conditions; the pragmatics of the ex-
periment may have suggested to participants that they ought to change
their prescriptions on each trial, potentially exaggerating the effect of
the experimental treatment and masking genuine individual-differences
patterns. To render the effects of the experimental treatment and of pre-
existing individual differences more directly comparable, study 7 used a
between-subjects design, in which each participant prescribed redis-
tribution levels for just one village. We chose to vary just one situa-
tional feature, the role of luck in generating inequality. Participants
therefore read about one just hypothetical village, where inequality in
resources was described as “mainly determined by luck” (high luck
condition) or “mainly determined by the amount of effort the gardener
puts in” (low luck condition).
Study 7 also gave us an opportunity to replicate, in a large in-
dependent sample, our finding that support for redistribution in actual
society is correlated with appraisals of the role of luck in life, and that
these appraisals mediate the effects of political orientation. In addition,
we sought to test a possible interpretation of these relations: do people's
political orientations influence the formation of their appraisals of the
role of luck in generating inequality? To address this question, we
included a third experimental condition (the unspecified condition): a
hypothetical village in which we did not provide any information about
the role of luck. We expected people with different political orientations
to have different priors about the importance of luck, leading them to
‘fill in’ in the missing information differentially.
The other motivation for study 7 was to investigate directly the
extent to which judgments about redistribution are held with moral
force. Participants in studies 1–6 may have viewed the appropriate
common-store contribution as a moral matter; or on the other hand,
they may have seen it as a simple matter of pragmatic convenience or
efficiency. Moral conviction about an issue is independent and distin-
guishable from strength or direction of opinion on that issue (Skitka,
Washburn, & Carsel, 2015). So, in study 7, in addition to asking for a
preferred level of redistribution, we measured moral conviction about
this preference. To benchmark their responses, we also asked for par-
ticipants' degrees of moral conviction about two other issues affecting
the hypothetical village. One of these, whether the village should have
a death penalty, was presumptively highly moral, since this issue car-
ries high levels of moral conviction, for participants of all opinions, in
other research (Skitka, Hanson, Washburn, & Mueller, 2018). The other
issue (the appropriate construction of houses) we designed to be a
largely pragmatic one. Thus, a degree of moral conviction for preferred
redistribution close to that of house-building would indicate that re-
distribution is largely seen as a pragmatic issue; whilst a degree of
moral conviction close to that of the death penalty would indicate that
it is seen as a moral one.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Participants in study 7 were 1795 UK adult volunteers from the
same online research participant pool as studies 1–6 (898 male, 894
female, 3 other; mean age 37.38, s.d. 12–62, range 18–81). None had
participated in earlier studies. As before, participants received a small
financial incentive to participate. All participants gave written in-
formed consent. The study was approved by the Faculty of Medical
Sciences ethics committee at Newcastle University.
3.1.2. Design and measures
Each participant read a verbal vignette describing one hypothetical
village (see SI Section 1 for link to materials) using similar text to the
introductory material of studies 1–6. In the high luck condition, the
vignette stated: ‘each year, some harvests are bigger than others. The
size of the harvest is mainly determined by luck. This is because there
are things like plant diseases that strike at random’. The low luck
condition vignette instead stated: ‘each year, some harvests are bigger
than others. The size of the harvest is mainly determined by the amount
of effort that the gardener puts in.’ The unspecified condition vignette
merely stated: ‘each year, some harvests are bigger than others.’
Our main dependent variable, preferred level of redistribution, was
implemented exactly as in studies 1–6. In addition, we asked for par-
ticipants' appraisals of the relative importance of luck vs. effort in de-
termining harvest size (0–100 scale). This was a variable of interest in
the unspecified condition, where we expected it to be associated with
political orientation and SDO. For the high and low conditions, it was
included as a manipulation check.
We measured the degree of moral conviction that attended judge-
ments of preferred level of redistribution, using a four-item scale based
on the items used in Skitka et al. (2018). These were: to what extent is
your view: ‘a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions’;
‘connected to your beliefs about fundamental right and wrong’; ‘based
on moral principle’; and ‘a moral stance.’ Each statement was rated on a
scale from 0, ‘not at all’ to 100, ‘very much’. We took the mean of the
four responses to give a moral conviction score with a possible range of
0–100. We obtained comparison moral-conviction information from
other domains, using two additional mini-vignettes that were the same
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in all three experimental conditions. For house building, we described
villagers as having two options about the kinds of house to build: round
houses, which were more durable and cooler in the summer, and square
houses, which were easier to build. We asked whether villagers should
try to build round or square houses, and then the same four moral
conviction items about this view. For capital punishment, the vignette
described a potential new law in the village introducing the death
penalty for serious crimes. Participants were asked whether the new
law would be a bad or good idea, along with the same four moral
conviction items. Scale reliabilities were high for all three moral con-
viction scales (redistribution: α = 0.91; house building: α = 0.94;
death penalty: α = 0.94).
The study finished with the same individual-differences measures as
studies 1–6. Scale reliability for SDO was similar to earlier studies
(α = 0.86).
3.1.3. Data analysis
Our protocol and predictions were pre-registered via the Open
Science framework (see SI, Section 1). With no repeated measures, data
other than the moral conviction variable were analysed using simple
general linear models. For moral conviction, we used linear mixed
models as in studies 1–6.
We fitted series of confirmatory models corresponding to our pre-
registered predictions, as outlined in SI, section 5. Our analyses of the
moral conviction data were exploratory, and included how moral
conviction about redistribution is associated with political orientation,
SDO and preferred redistribution level, as well as how the level of moral
conviction about redistribution compared to the levels of moral con-
viction about housebuilding and capital punishment. Data and R code
are available via the Open Science Framework [dataset] (Nettle & Saxe,
2019).
3.1.4. Sample size and data peeking
To set our target sample size, we used the within-subjects shift be-
tween low and high luck conditions, and the between-subjects variation
in preferred redistribution, from studies 1 and 2. This allowed us to
generate an ‘as if’ anticipated between-subjects effect size of d = 0.39.
The minimum sample size required to detect this with 90% power at
p < .05 was 138. We therefore set the group sizes for the high and low
luck conditions to 150 each. We decided to oversample the unspecified
condition, as our predictions concerned correlations between variables
within this group considered alone. We thus targeted 300 participants
in the unspecified condition, producing a target sample size of 600
participants overall.
After running the planned number of participants, the mean
difference in preferred redistribution between the high and low luck
conditions was 4.10 points in the predicted direction, but this difference
was not significant (t=1.44, p= .15). The smaller than expected effect
(anticipated difference 10.45 points) may have been explained by the
mean perceived importance of luck in the high luck condition being
only 48.18 (SD 26.37) and 29.62 (SD 20.65) in the low luck condition.
Thus, our experimental manipulation only succeeded in moving the
perceived importance of luck from a low to medium level, not low to
high as planned. The magnitude of the observed difference in preferred
redistribution level is commensurate with this (for example, in study 1,
the difference in mean preferred redistribution between the low- and
medium-luck villages was 4.61 points). We recalculated required power
based on the emerging small effect, and ran additional participants,
with a target total of 600 per condition (evenly across all conditions,
thus 1800 participants in all).
Post-hoc increases in sample size inflate type-I error rates (Sagarin,
Ambler, & Lee, 2014). We therefore recalculated the critical p-values
required in the final sample to keep overall type-I error rates at 0.05,
using the pcrit formula (Sagarin et al., 2014), for one additional round of
data collection, and assuming that any p-value< .2 would have led us
to collect more data. This corrected p-value was 0.04, which we
therefore set as the α value for the analysis of final sample. All sub-
sequent analyses reported are on the final sample.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Experimental effects
The perceived importance of luck was higher in the high condition
(mean 51.69, s.d. 25.38) than the low luck condition (mean 29.15, s.d.
20.86; confirmatory analysis; t = 16.74, p < .001, d = 0.97). Thus,
our manipulation was effective, but only moved the perceived im-
portance of luck from a low to a medium level on average. The mean
perceived importance of luck for the unspecified condition was inter-
mediate between the other two conditions (36.14, s.d. 20.30).
Participants preferred higher levels of redistribution in the high
(mean 43.38, s.d. 24.10) than the low luck condition (mean 39.70, s.d.
22.24; t = 2.74, p = .006, d = 0.16; confirmatory analysis; Fig. 5A).
Preferred redistribution for the unspecified condition was similar to the
low luck condition (mean 39.38, s.d. 23.46; Fig. 5A).
3.2.2. Role of political orientation
We predicted that left-right self-placement or SDO would affect
perceived importance of luck most strongly in the unspecified condi-
tion. To test this, we fitted interactive models with perceived im-
portance of luck as the outcome, and condition and either left-right self-
Fig. 5. Study 7 results for preferred level of redistribution. A. Mean preferred level of redistribution (percentage of harvest to be transferred to common store,
mean ± 1 s.e.) by experimental condition. B. Preferred level of redistribution against left-right self-placement. Colour coding distinguishes experimental conditions
using the same colour scheme as panel A. Lines represent linear fits. C. As for panel B, but for SDO in place of left-right self-placement.
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placement orientation or SDO as predictors. Contrary to our pre-regis-
tered prediction, there were no significant interactions between con-
dition being unspecified and left-right self-placement (B = −0.02
(0.06), t = −0.42, p = .676) or SDO (B = 0.22 (0.14), t = 1.59,
p = .113). However, when we removed the non-significant interaction
terms, there were significant main effects of both left-right self-place-
ment (B =−0.05 (0.02), t =−2.08, p = .038) and SDO (B =−0.14
(0.06), t =−2.50, p = .013) on perceived importance of luck. That is,
people who described themselves as more right wing, or scored higher
in SDO, thought luck was a less important determinant of harvest size in
the village, whether we specified the role of luck as high or low, or left
it unspecified.
We repeated the above analyses but with preferred level of redis-
tribution as the outcome variable. We had predicted stronger effects of
left-right self-placement and SDO on preferred redistribution in the
unspecified condition. Again contrary to our prediction, the effect of
left-right self-placement on preferred redistribution level was no
stronger in the unspecified condition (interaction B = 0.02 (0.06),
t = 0.30, p = .767). The same was true for SDO (interaction B = 0.20
(0.15), t= 1.37, p= .170). However, for both left-right self-placement
and SDO, there were significant main effects on preferred level of re-
distribution, additive to those of condition (left-right self-placement:
B = −0.09 (0.02), t = −4.00, p < .001; SDO: B = −0.19 (0.06),
t = −3.24, p = .001). Thus, regardless of condition, people who saw
themselves as more right-wing or scored higher in SDO preferred
slightly lower levels of redistribution (Fig. 5B, C).
In models including both a political orientation variable and ex-
perimental treatment, they each explained a similar, small amount of
variation (model with left-right self-placement: η2 = 0.0064 for con-
dition and η2 = 0.0086 for left-right self-placement; model with SDO:
η = 0.0068 for condition and η2 = 0.011 for SDO). Another way of
expressing their relative predictive power is to compare the respective
partial coefficients from the general linear models. On this basis, the
effect of experimentally specifying a high role of luck was equivalent to
moving a participant 39.62 points (1.71 standard deviations) to the left
on the 0–100 left-right self-placement scale. The equivalent calculation
for SDO was 19.44 points (2.12 standard deviations) on the SDO total
score.
3.2.3. Mediation by perceived importance of luck
Our pre-registered plan was to test for the mediation of the
relationships between the individual differences variables and preferred
redistribution by perceived importance of luck, using the data from the
unspecified condition alone. However, since left-right self-placement
and SDO predicted perceived importance of luck in much the same way
across all our conditions, not just the unspecified one, we present these
analyses instead for the whole dataset controlling for condition (results
for the unspecified condition alone are similar).
The mediation pathway from left-right self-placement to preferred
redistribution via perceived importance of luck was marginally non-
significant (B = −0.007 (0.004), z = −0.196, p = .0501), and ac-
counted for 7.6% of the total association between left-right self-place-
ment and preferred redistribution. For SDO, the mediation pathway via
perceived importance of luck was significant (B = −0.02 (0.01),
z = −2.31, p = .021), accounting for 10.7% of the total SDO-redis-
tribution association.
3.2.4. Moral conviction
The three issues (redistribution, housebuilding and death penalty)
were rated with different levels of moral conviction (exploratory ana-
lysis; F2, 3586.9 = 1084.70, p < .001). Moral conviction for redis-
tribution (estimated marginal mean 66.81, s.e. 0.55) was substantially
higher than for housebuilding (estimated marginal mean 45.50, s.e.
0.55, Bhouse =−21.31 (0.73), t =−29.18, p < .001), but lower than
for the death penalty (estimated marginal mean 79.12, s.e. 0.55,
Bdeath = 12.31 (0.73), t = 16.85, p < .001). The mean moral con-
viction for redistribution was around two thirds of the way from that of
housebuilding to that of the death penalty (Fig. 6). Moral conviction
about redistribution was positively correlated with preferred redis-
tribution level (r = 0.21, p < .001). It was weakly negatively corre-
lated with left-right self-placement (r = −0.05, p = .02) and SDO
(r=−0.11, p < .001): that is, people who placed themselves more to
the right or scored higher on SDO tended to have slightly lower levels of
moral conviction about redistribution.
3.2.5. Beliefs about actual society
As in the study 1–6 data, preferred redistribution for the hypothe-
tical village was positively but weakly correlated with support for
welfare in actual society (r = 0.11, p < .001). Left-right self-place-
ment and SDO predicted preferences for redistribution in actual society
(confirmatory analyses; left-right: B = −0.46 (0.02), t = −21.27
p < .001; SDO: B =−1.39 (0.05), t=−27.20, p < .001). Just as in
studies 1–6, and as per pre-registered prediction, these relationships
were partially mediated by varying belief in the importance of luck in
actual society (mediation pathway: right-left B = −0.06 (0.01),
z =−7.20, p < .001; mediation pathway accounted for 12.3% of total
association; SDO B =−0.10 (0.02), z =−6.54, p < .001; mediation
pathway accounted for 7.4% of total association).
3.3. Discussion
Study 7 added some key information to the findings emerging from
studies 1–6. For one situational feature, luck, we were able to detect an
effect on preferred redistribution in a between-subjects design. We have
not extended this demonstration to the other situational features, but
study 7 is a demonstration in principle that the earlier findings are not
purely consequences of changing stimulus features within subjects. The
effect size for luck in study 7 was small (d = 0.16), and hence a large
sample size was required to detect it. However, the actual shift in means
(about 4 percentage points) was comparable to the shift from the low to
medium luck conditions in study 1. The small effect size merely reflects
the very large variability that our village task elicits (this variability
was similar in study 7 to any one of the villages in studies 1–6).
Experimental treatment and political orientation explained similar
amounts of variation in preferred redistribution. To put this another
way, moving from the low luck to the high luck condition whilst
holding political orientation constant was equivalent to a roughly two
Fig. 6. Distribution of moral conviction by issue, study 7. Scale range is 0–100.
Coloured envelopes show the density of the response data. Embedded boxes
show the median and inter-quartile range.
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s.d. shift in political orientation whilst keeping condition constant. This
reflects the fact that although the experimental effect was small, poli-
tical orientation was also a weak predictor of preferred redistribution.
We feel this is unlikely to be due to a restriction of range of political
orientations in our participant pool. Our sample had a mean of 41.89 on
the left-right self-placement scale, with a standard deviation of 23.21. A
nationally-representative 2004 survey of the UK asked the same ques-
tion on a 10-point scale, obtaining a mean equivalent to 50.50 and a
standard deviation equivalent to 19.50 (European Commission, 2004).
Thus, although the central tendency of our sample was slightly further
to the left than would be true of a representative sample, our sample
contained at least as much variability as the national population.
We predicted that where we left the role of luck in generating in-
equality unspecified, political orientation would supply appraisals. In
fact, the findings were stronger than the prediction: even where we
attempted to fix the importance of luck through the stimuli (i.e. the
high- and low-luck conditions), more right-wing people or people
higher in SDO appraised luck as less important. We discuss this finding
more fully in the general discussion. Finally, study 7 demonstrated that
for most participants, redistribution was a matter of moderate to high
moral conviction; not as high as the death penalty, but substantially
higher than a purely pragmatic choice. This validates our assumption
that the psychology of redistribution whose workings we are un-
covering is part of, or at least draws on, moral psychology.
4. General discussion
Over seven studies, we found that people's prescribed level of re-
distribution for hypothetical societies was affected by luck, with higher
redistribution where luck plays a greater role in the initial distribution
of resources; by social heterogeneity, with lower redistribution in so-
cially heterogeneous than homogeneous groups; and by the presence of
inter-group conflict, with higher redistribution in times of inter-group
warfare than in peace. In the course of the experiments, we also came to
investigate the effect of resource scarcity, finding that most people fa-
vour a higher level of redistribution when resources are abundant than
when they are scarce. Redistribution judgements were systematically
related to situational features, even though people were not making
them for themselves and did not stand to benefit. The judgements
carried, for most people, moderate or high levels of moral conviction;
we thus consider that the psychology of redistribution is a structured
cognitive system that forms part of moral psychology.
Across real societies, simple aggregate economic measures, such as
the inequality of the initial income distribution, do not successfully
predict the variation in redistribution preferences (Dallinger, 2010;
Georgiadis & Manning, 2012; Lübker, 2007). Our experiments support,
and provide an individual-level mechanism for, the contention that
appraisals of society also matter: how did the resources end up un-
equally distributed initially; who is the set of people involved in the
relationship; what are the common external projects of the social group;
and how much surplus is there to go round? As the available in-
formation about these features changes, so will the distribution of views
on redistribution.
Although a greater role of luck in generating the initial distribution
of resources increased the preferred level of redistribution, our findings
suggest compensation for bad luck (i.e. risk pooling) is not the only
function served by the human motivation to share out. The hetero-
geneity and war effects have nothing to do with smoothing out in-
dividual production risk, and in study 2, a substantial amount of re-
distribution was favoured even where we specified that luck plays no
role. Thus, people intuitively understand that there are multiple types
of benefit to sharing out resources, and hence multiple constellations of
circumstances that favour it.
Situational features affected more than just the preferred level of
redistribution. They also affected inferences about how the redistribu-
tion should best be done; and about the implementation problems that
might befall it. Prescription and perceived implementation problems
were sometimes aligned and sometimes not. For heterogeneous villages,
participants both favoured lower redistribution, and predicted that
implementing redistribution would go worse in all the possible ways we
asked about. In times of war, by contrast, participants prescribed higher
redistribution, but at the same time felt that implementation problems,
including evasion, cheating, disincentive effects and arguments would
be worse (studies 5 and 6). They anticipated a ‘fog of war’ in which
evasion and cheating would be rife, akin to the ‘anomie’ discussed by
Teymoori, Bastian, and Jetten (2017). This suggests that variation in
support for redistribution should in future be parsed into separate
components of different moral ideals, versus different inferences about
what is likely to be possible to achieve in practice given the anticipated
behaviour of others. Societal circumstances can evidently affect these
two facets independently of one another.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of our findings is that in studies
1–6, most participants did not have a consistent preference for a level of
redistribution in the villages. Moreover, political orientation variables
were only weak predictors of preferred redistribution, and in no study
were there any significant interactions between experimental variables
and political orientation. Thus, people of different political starting
points responded to the situational features in like manner. These
findings strike against certain accounts of variation in support for re-
distribution. First, they call into question the idea that support for a
certain level of redistribution is a stably transmitted cultural value. If
this were the case, it would be hard to see how so many of our parti-
cipants could switch from advocating almost zero redistribution to al-
most complete communism in the within-subjects studies. In one pre-
vious study, the cultural difference in support for welfare between
Americans and Scandinavians was abolished merely by standardizing
the information the different groups had about recipient deservingness
(Aaroe & Petersen, 2014; though see below for discussion of the con-
strasting findings of Almås et al., 2019). Our experimental manipula-
tions achieved similar shifts within the same individuals: within our
hypothetical world, we turned attitudinal Americans into attitudinal
Scandinavians and back again from one trial to the next. Second, our
findings do not support the idea people disagree over the right level of
redistribution largely because different dispositions (Rockey, 2009),
basic moral values (Graham et al., 2009) or social dominance orienta-
tions (Kteily et al., 2017) necessarily entail particular preferred levels of
redistribution. Whether someone self-identified as left- or right-wing, or
low versus high in SDO, carried rather little information about the re-
distribution level they would set, and no information at all about how
they would respond to any of the experimental cues.
Whilst people of different self-declared political orientations ap-
parently differ rather little in terms of an ideal level of redistribution for
a given set of hypothetical social facts, they do clearly come to different
conclusions about what should be done about redistribution in their
own societies. We consider several ways of reconciling this with our
findings. In reality, voters have to pay through their taxes for the po-
licies they endorse, or may stand to benefit from welfare arrangements,
whereas our method of hypothetical rating is consequence-free. People
with different political orientations might weigh their own financial
incentives differently (Zettler & Hilbig, 2010). Further, people may feel
affiliation to political parties or movements, and endorse pro- or anti-
redistribution arguments because those arguments are advocated by
those parties or movements (Cohen, 2003). In short, actual political
preferences in real societies involve more than just the computational
principles we have studied here, since these are overlaid with party
loyalties, prudential considerations and other factors. Of note, though,
left-right self-placement and SDO also explained a fairly small propor-
tion of the variation in support for welfare in the participants' actual
society (20% and 29% respectively, study 7 data), where all the layers
of party affiliation and self-interest considerations are present.
People of different political orientations may share the same map-
ping from situational features to preferred levels of redistribution, but
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differ in their perceptions of what the situational features in their so-
ciety are. We provide two sources of evidence for this view. When it
came to judgements about actual society, participants who self-identi-
fied as right wing supported welfare less, and this was partially medi-
ated by their appraisal that luck was not so important for success in life
(we observed this in studies 1–6 and replicated it in study 7). The extent
of the mediation was modest; but by measuring a broader range of
beliefs about society, such as the perception that its members are fun-
damentally alike, that there is a threat of inter-group conflict, that so-
ciety's resources are scarce, and so on, it might be possible to more fully
account for the association. More strongly, in study 7, we found that
people of different political orientations formed different appraisals of
how important luck was likely to be in a hypothetical village, even
when we attempted to control their appraisals by telling them the an-
swer in the experimental materials. These different appraisals partially
mediated the political-orientation differences in the level of redis-
tribution they preferred for that village. These results may be relevant
to interpreting the findings of Almås et al. (2019). Those researchers
found that, even when the role of luck in generating income inequality
in an artifical workgroup was specified explicitly in the experimental
setup, conservatives relative to progressives (and Americans relative to
Norwegians) chose to redistribute less. This may have been because,
despite the attempts by the researchers to control the perceived role of
luck through the materials, different people nonetheless appraised its
importance differently. This was not however directly tested by Almås
et al. (2019), since they did not measure appraisals.
A final possibility is that people of different political persuasions
agree fairly well on the ideal level of redistribution, but have different
beliefs about the possibility of actually achieving the ideal. Though not
pessimistic in a general way (Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012), right-
wing people are more focussed on threats as compared to opportunities
(Janoff-Bulman, 2009). In our study 6, people who self-identified as
right-wing thought that implementing high redistribution would be less
effective at improving individual welfare and collective efficacy; and
would be attended by greater disincentive effects, greater reluctance to
pay in, and an increase in conflict and division. This suggests that more
right-wing (or high-SDO) positions on redistribution are at least partly
driven by a greater gap between the morally ideal situation and the
inferred likely outcome if implementation is attempted. This must in
turn reflect different underlying priors or implicit theories about how
other people behave.
Leaving individual differences aside, our experiments demonstrate
that influencing people's views about what the situation in society is
like will have systematic consequences for their support for redis-
tribution. This has major implications for political persuasion. Effective
strategies to alter support for redistribution would not need to explicitly
discuss what level of redistribution is right. Instead, they would more
effectively concentrate on influencing appraisals of what the facts about
society are. If communicators can effectively disseminate narratives of
the large (or small) role of luck in initial resource distributions, (dis-)
similarity of fellow citizens, serious external threat, or overall scarcity,
then shifts in support for redistribution will follow, without redis-
tribution needing to be explicitly reasoned about, or even mentioned.
This is what happened in our study 7: a small difference in the framing
of the discourse about the society led to a systematic difference in the
experimental population's distribution of support for redistribution. The
effect size, from that one-off verbal intervention, was admittedly small,
but it would not be negligible when applied at the population scale.
Moreover, real-world politicised discourses are prevalent, pervasive,
and repetitive.
Given the psychology of redistribution we have begun to map out,
political persuasion strategies that appear sensible could backfire. For
example, stressing the poverty and hunger that exists within affluent
societies seems an appropriate strategy to use in arguing for greater
redistribution. However if such a strategy promotes the perception of
general resource scarcity, our findings suggest it could be
counterproductive. Advocates of redistribution could instead be stres-
sing that resources are, by historical standards, remarkably abundant.
Likewise, in advocating a Universal Basic Income, proponents often
draw attention to the role of luck in the current state of society (Nettle,
2018; Standing, 2017). However, our data suggest this strategy will fail:
cues of luck instead trigger a preference for targeting benefits at those
most in need. The clearest preference for a Universal Basic Income-like
equal share per villager was found in Study 2 exactly when luck played
no role at all in the initial distribution of resources. This suggests that
the Universal Basic Income proposal might be more attractive if pre-
sented as solving different problems than the need to pool risk. The fact
that most participants wanted all villagers to interact with the common
store even where risk-pooling was superfluous (i.e. the low- or no-luck
treatments) suggests that, in intuitive thought about society, redis-
tributive mechanisms have other functions, possibly including the
creation and mutual recognition of social relationships.
We have here laid out an experimental methodology for system-
atically studying the situational features that affect support for redis-
tribution. Importantly, the methodology allows those features to be
varied parametrically within subjects, laying bare the logic of what
makes greater redistribution feel right and what makes it feel wrong.
The method would readily extend to further features, and other parti-
cipant pools. We hope that understanding the operating principles of
the psychology of redistribution will contribute to explaining change
within, and variation between, societies in how social and economic
inequality is addressed.
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